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ENACTMENTS OF PROFESSIONALISM: A
STUDY OF JUDGES' AND LAWYERS'
ACCOUNTS OF ETHICS AND CIVILITY
IN LITIGATION'*
Austin Sarat"'
"There is no market for ethical practice."1

-Associate

in a large firm

-Partner

in a large firm

"Clients buy our integrity."
"It is not the way it was twenty years ago. Tough. Get with it. Law is
a business."

-In-house
"Ours is a cry for guidance. .
issues."

.

counsel in a major corporation
. We need clarification on ethical

-Associate in a large law firm
"Ethicalbehavior is a function of tie economic freedom of the firm.
The more profitable a fir,

the better its ethical climate."

-Partner

in a large firm

"Big firms aren't bastions of ethics. It is their profit that they care
abouL"

-In-house

counsel in a major corporation

"I assume that lying (in the discovery process) is routine."
-Plaintiffs'

lawyer

INTRODUCTION: THE LANGUAGE OF CRISIS AND THE POLITICS
OF PROFESSIONALISM

Periodically the legal profession, or more precisely some part of the
profession, discovers or declares that the profession as a whole, or an
important segment of it, is in "crisis."12 Crises in the profession do not
* Reprinted by permission. © 1998 American Bar Association.
reserved.

All rights

** William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science, Amherst College. I am grateful to my colleagues in the project, Ethics: Beyond the Rules,
for their stimulating intellectual companionship and to Douglas Frenkel for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Quotations of statements made by study participants are taken from the author's notes or from the transcripts of the study's structured group discussions. The
transcripts, which are confidential to protect the identities of study participants, are
on file with Professor Robert Nelson of the American Bar Foundation. For a brief
description of the study, see Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in CorporateLitigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 837, 838-42 (1998).
2. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One.: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in Lawyers' IdealsfLawyers' Practices: Transformations in the
American Legal Profession 144 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
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just happen; they are "created" and marketed by particular segments
of the bar hoping to mobilize their colleagues to deal with what are
perceived to be pressing problems. At the same time, the marketing
of crisis is part of an ongoing competition for status, prestige, and recognition that marks all social groups. To call something a crisis is to
label a particular set of events in such a way as to add a sense of
urgency to our responses to those events; it is in this sense a political
gesture designed to evoke particular responses. In different historical
periods different entrepreneurs shop different crises, and each period
is marked by its own level of receptivity to such marketing. In some
periods, claims about a crisis have been well and eagerly received; in
others, there have been few takers.
During the late 1980s and the 1990s, the climate for the marketing
of crisis has been thought to be quite good. It is good because we are
witnessing important shifts in the demographics and conditions of law
practice, 4 shifts which leave particular segments of the bar feeling that
times are changing in ways that endanger values to which they are
deeply attached. Moreover, the growth of specialized media-The
American Lawyer, The National Law Journal, etc.-means that there
are ready vehicles through which entrepreneurs can get widespread
publicity about different crises. Labeling crises within the legal profession as constructed or marketed, however, is not meant to denigrate those for whom the problems seem quite "real" and pressing, or
to suggest that those problems are themselves simply matters of perception. It does not deny the importance of the underlying events
(e.g., uncivil behavior, hiding documents, etc.) which may occasion the
use of the crisis label. Yet, noting their constructed character may be
useful in reminding us that one person's crisis is another person's
healthy change; what one segment of the bar bemoans as indicative of
decline, another, in an increasingly divided and segmented profession,
may celebrate.
The "crisis" of the 1980s and 1990s goes to the heart of the legal
profession's traditional self-understanding. It is one in which market
forces threaten to overwhelm the partially anti-market orientations
that go by the name "professionalism," in which previously taken-forgranted ways of doing business among the most prestigious sectors of
the bar can no longer be taken for granted, and in which one of the
major success stories of the twentieth century-the large law firmfaces substantial challenges. 5 As Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay
3. See id. at 168-73.
4. See Richard L. Abel, The Transformationof the American Legal Profession,20
L. & Soc'y Rev. 7, 7 (1986) (discussing the various changes throughout the legal profession in recent years).
5. See generally Lincoln Caplan, Skadden: Power, Money, and the Rise of a
Legal Empire (1993) (noting that the firm's growth was motivated by a "business-justbusiness" attitude).
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argue: "Today there is a palpable anxiety and dismay within the legal
profession concerning the commercialization and the concomitant decline of professionalism in the setting of the big law firm.""
As market forces take on greater and greater salience and the competitiveness of the legal market increases, the very meaning and viability of professionalism as an ideal guiding law practice is being called
into question.7 Lawyers at all levels of the profession today ask themselves, with unusual urgency, whether their work is really more of a
business than a profession, and whether the allegedly genteel ways of
a romanticized bygone era can be recaptured. They ask themselves
whether the norms of professionalism are still viable in the face of an
expanding bar, increased competitiveness, and growing incivility in
lawyer-to-lawyer relations.
Against this backdrop, more than a decade ago the American Bar
Association's Commission on Professionalism (the "Stanley Commission") issued a "Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism."8 The Stanley Commission exemplified one style of crisis
entrepreneurship, observing that "the practices of some lawyers cry
out for correction."9 The Stanley Commission further noted that
growing diversity and specialization in the bar was, in part, responsible for that fact. 10 While it recognized various ways in which some of
the most cherished ideals of the profession were (and are) under attack, it reaffirmed their continuing validity. In response to new conditions and new challenges, the Stanley Commission tried to provide a
coherent identification of the demands that professionalism makes on
all lawyers."1 Despite growing diversity among lawyers, and in the
face of increasing commercialism, the Stanley Commission argued
that lawyering continues to be a distinctive and cohesive occupational
pursuit, that it is, and should be, a profession, not a business.1 2 Moreover, it is a profession guided by ideals of practice for which the values
of efficiency and the mechanisms of cost-benefit calculations are an
inadequate substitute. Using the words of Roscoe Pound, the Stanley
Commission described lawyers as united by a "common calling" and
6. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation
of the Big Law Firm 2 (1991).
7. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The
Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in Lawyers' IdealslLawyers' Practices,

supra note 2, at 177, 178-79 [hereinafter Nelson & Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism].
8. Commission on Professionalism, American Bar Ass'n, In the Spirit of Public
Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986) [hereinafter Stanley Commission].

9. Id. at 1.
10. See id. at 2.
11. For a similar effort in another context, see Eliot Freidson, Profession of
Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (1971).
12. See Stanley Commission, supra note 8,at 50-51.
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insisted that, despite their differences, lawyers share "common ideas
of professionalism."' 3

In its effort to lend coherence to the idea of professionalism and to
identify commonality and unity among lawyers, the Stanley Commission viewed professionalism as a set of essential attributes, the possession of which sets particular occupations apart from others. 4 This
view seeks solidity in the idea of professionalism and uses that idea to
explain why certain occupational groups can claim particular privileges that are not accorded to all occupations. Yet, this view has not
gone unchallenged.15 Critics suggest that professionalism cannot be
reduced to a set of essential attributes, that it is not a thing, and that
what professionals do, lawyers in particular, is not as easily distinguishable from business as some of its defenders assert. "[N]umerous
commentators," David Wilkins argues, "have demonstrated that the
bar is only able to assume that most lawyers embrace noncommercial
values by consciously blinding itself to the many instances in which
lawyers (including bar leaders) have aggressively pursued their own
economic interests to the detriment of both clients and the legal system."' 6 As the critics see it, professionalism is an ideology and a way
of describing the political project through which occupations seek con-

13. Id. at 10. As against the view put forward by the Stanley Commission, one
might expect that the remarkable diversity in the legal profession (of social background, of types of practice, and of settings in which law is practiced) might conceivably be bridged by shared ideas of professionalism and a common perception of
possible problems and preferred solutions, or it might just as likely be reflected in a
comparable diversity in what lawyers believe about their work and its social value.
Additionally, such diversity might well be reflected in widely varied reactions to any
effort to market a "crisis" of the profession at large. See David B. Wilkins, Everyday
Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in Everyday
Practices and Trouble Cases 68, 81-82 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
14. For an elaboration of these attributes, see generally Wilbert Moore, The Professions: Roles and Rules 95 (1970) (explaining that although professionals have a
"strong sense of collective identity," they still must compete with each other); Everett
C. Hughes, Professions, in The Professions in America 1, 4 (Kenneth S. Lynn ed.,
1965) (noting that "occupations try to change themselves or their image, or both, in
the course of a movement to become 'professionalized"'); and Harold L. Wilensky,
The Professionalizationof Everyone?, 70 Am. J. of Soc. 137, 138 (1964) (noting that
the "traditional model of professionalism, based mainly on the 'free' professions of
medicine and law, misses some aspects of the mixed forms of control now emerging
among salaried professionals").
15. See, e.g., Terence J. Johnson, Professions and Power 21-38 (1972) (discussing
professionalization and professionalism); Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis 113 (1977) ("The monopolistic tendency inherent
in all projects of professional reform becomes all the more visible; meritocratic justifications are still too weak to legitimize closure of access."); Robert W. Habenstein,
Critiqueof 'Profession'Asa Sociological Category, 4 Soc. Q. 291, 297 (1963) (discussing "[a] variant of sociological thinking about 'profession' . . . [which] is ...a set of
rationalizations about the worth and necessity of certain areas of work which, when
internalized, gives the practitioners a moral justification for privilege, if not license").
16. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 82 (citation omitted).
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trol of the market for their services. 17 Appeals to lawyers to act professionally or to live up to the highest standards of the profession in
their conduct are, in this view, as much for external consumption as
they are genuine appeals for reform.
Critics present professionalism as a rhetorical device that disguises
the pursuit of self-interest as public spiritedness.18 Moreover, while
the Stanley Commission emphasized the underlying unity of lawyers,
critics highlight stratification 19 and conflict.' They argue that particular segments of the bar periodically mobilize a crisis of professionalism to assert and protect their own privileged position against the
challenges of other lawyers or of outside groups.-1 Professionalism is,
in this view, an excuse for excluding those groups or marginalizing
new entrants to the bar. Thus, instead of helping to build consensus, it
is part of a top-down social control effort."
Today, the problems of professional self-regulation that were highlighted by the Stanley Commission do not seem to fall quite so neatly
into this elite control, top-down model. Whereas twenty or thirty
years ago the focus of much concern within the organized profession
was the solo practitioner operating at the margins of the profession, 3
today, the marketed crisis seems to be located within the elite of the

17. See, eg., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59
Tex. L. Rev. 639, 653 (1981) (stating that "[a]ll
occupations in a capitalist system seek
to control the markets in which they sell their labor") [hereinafter Abel, Ethical

Rules].
18. See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in
Modem America 12-13 (1976) (presenting a historical framework "for comprehending the ominous gap between the services dispensed by the legal profession and
equal justice"); Freidson, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that the word "profession" is
used really only by occupations that have a "hunger for prestige"); Ivan Illich, Disabling Professions,in Disabling Professions 11, 15-20 (1977) (discussing the dominance
of professionals in the twentieth century).
19. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Lawyers, in Law and The Social Sciences 369. 395
(Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (noting that the hierarchic structure
within law firms leads to a division between associates and partners); John Hagan et
al., Class Structure and Legal Practice: Inequality and Mobility Among Toronto Lawyers, 22 L. & Soc'y Rev. 9, 22 (1988) (finding that "the legal profession is highly stratified in the size of the capitalist class and the managerial and supervisory
bourgeoisie").
20. See generally Rue Bucher & Anslem Strauss, Professionsin Process,66 Am. J.
Soc. 325, 330-31 (1961) (noting that colleagueship is probably rare and, in reality,
segments within a profession limit colleagueship).
21. See generally Auerbach, supra note 18, at 128-29 (arguing that "as long as
merit was defined by the professional elite to correlate with social class and ethnic
origins, mobility and fluidity were tightly controlled, and the availability of legal resources and the possibility of equal justice were sharply curtailed").
22. See Abel, Ethical Rules, supra note 17, at 653-67.
23. See, e.g., Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City
Bar 129-30 (1966) (discussing the various sizes of lav firms in New York).
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bar itself.2 4 It is being used as a tool in a more horizontal status competition in which problems are identified by some high status practitioners and attributed to others of similar status. Among these
lawyers there is, as Robert Nelson and David Trubek point out, a
"general sense that lawyers [have] lost control of their markets, workplaces, and careers .
".2.."5
In addition, some of the most visible and
damaging breaches of professional norms now occur within large,
respected law firms in metropolitan areas.2 6 Whereas twenty or thirty
years ago the organized profession attempted to police and prevent
gross ethical breaches, lawyers are presumed today to cut corners,
evade rules, and respond to what seem to many to be incompatible
demands for high quality work at cut-rate prices. As a result, the daily
reality of law practice seems, according to many lawyers, less rewarding, less secure, and noticeably less civil.
In this context, professionalism should be regarded as neither a set
of essential attributes nor a singular tool produced and used by the
powerful sector in a struggle to suppress the powerless. 7 It is far too
vague, complex, and contradictory to serve either purpose. Even the
Stanley Commission acknowledged, although it did not make much of
that acknowledgment, that professionalism "is an elastic 2concept
the
8
meaning and application of which are hard to pin down."1
This elasticity makes professionalism available as symbolic capital
in the clash of cultures among lawyers. Professionalism today, however, is a highly contested concept, the symbolic capital of which varies from one part of the bar to another. Because it is robust in its
credible meanings, it provides the conceptual terrain for status politics
within the bar and is used by different interests to claim respectability
and legitimacy. 9 Yet, because its meanings are so hard to pin down, it
is a terrain which can never be confidently secured. Its elasticity
means that professionalism can be appropriated and deployed by lawyers representing a wide range of interests and approaches to practice.
That elasticity invites the generation of competing "accounts" of their
24. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 3-4 (1993); William Simon, Babbit v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional
Ideal, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 565, 585-86 (1985).
25. Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigmsin
Studies of the Legal Profession, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 2, at
1, 14 [hereinafter Nelson & Trubek, New Problems].
26. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After
Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1145, 1147-1159 (1993) (discussing misconduct
charges brought against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler).
27. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Visions of Practicein Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 469, 471 (1984) (comparing the conservative and liberal approaches to
professionalism).
28. Stanley Commission, supra note 8, at 10.
29. See Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American
Temperance Movement 63-65 (1963).
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values and activities by different groups of lawyers." It provides a
terrain within which justifications, excuses, and explanations can be
provided for conduct
by one segment of the bar which another finds
31
objectionable.
Today, professionalism, whatever its role may be in generating accounts, justifications, excuses, and explanations, is no longer the unquestioned, hegemonic value to which all lawyers proclaim adherence.
As one lawyer working as in-house counsel for a major corporation
put it, "The language of professionalism is a smokescreen." This lawyer's critique of professionalism is but one of an increasing number of
such criticisms from within the profession itself. 2 Important voices
within the profession now openly proclaim that law is, and should be,
a business because business values are themselves more than adequate
in policing lawyers' conduct, and in insuring the efficient, cost-effective delivery of high quality legal services. As Wilkins explained, "In
the 1980s,... elite law firms raised the business aspects of their practices to unprecedented heights."3 3
In this view, good lawyering requires that lawyers understand the
limits of their own knowledge and competence. The good lawyer
knows enough not to try to substitute either his moral values or his
business judgment for that of someone who "knows his own business."
Above all else, lawyers are supposed to know what they are talking
about and only to talk about what they know. Civility is only important to the extent that it facilitates productivity. Thus, not only is the
meaning of professionalism contested, but its hold on lawyers' allegiance may be eroding. In the face of that erosion, the identification
of an allegedly "common" crisis in professional values seems unlikely
to mobilize anything close to universal recognition and assent.
Yet, undoubtedly, professionalism continues to provide some segments of the bar "maps of problematic social reality"' which help
constitute and express their particular interests and energize their concerns about such things as the ethics and civility of litigation. Professionalism gives meaning to the social relations, histories, and activities
of these lawyers and connects their ideas and values with their interests and positions. It always takes on meaning in the localities and
conditions in which lawyers practice.3" Place and time shape the fragments and configurations used to construct the maps of social reality
which claim the label of professionalism.
30. See Marvin B. Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts. 33 Am. Soc. Rev. 46,46
(1968).
31. See id at 47-52.

32. See generally Simon, supra note 24, at 586 (noting "that few lawyers ever
achieved the ability... to express their public commitments in their work").
33. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 88 (emphasis added).
34. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 220 (1973).
35. See Nelson & Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism,supra note 7, at 179.
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Despite its local origins and the contested terrain on which it is
36
deployed, professionalism is nonetheless proclaimed in global terms.
Its proponents continue to define contingent practices as universal
and necessary, 37 advancing their understanding of appropriate professional practice as the only conceivable understanding. In this context,
any claim to professionalism masks its particularview of law practice
by asserting its claim to general respect and allegiance. Each claim
seeks to provide an exclusive, normatively coherent and authoritative
portrait of lawyering.
At the heart of this idea of lawyer professionalism is a vision of
autonomy and ethical practice,3" of civility and decorum in the daily
life of lawyers, and of lawyers committed to and regulated by a set of
principles encoded in the profession's Model Rules. The image of
lawyer as statesman looms large as the unspoken model to which lawyers should aspire.3 9 In this image, lawyers' ethics go beyond strict
adherence to professional rules. Rather, they reflect the dictates of
practical wisdom, a capacious sense of the public interest, and a judicious ability to see and reconcile the client's long-term interest with
the best interests of both law and the society it serves. As Robert
Gordon explains, this conception entrusts lawyers
with a distinctive political mission in a commercial republic, that of
being the bearers of an autonomous public-regarding civic culture,
...to make them real and effective not just in the occupation of
public office but in every corner of social life, including most definitely the practice of advising and representing clients.
In this image, the lawyer "harmonize[s] the pursuit of private interest
with the universal interest of the whole."4 1 Lawyers would, as a result,
ennoble the private realm and, at the same time, provide discipline in
public affairs.
Professionalism so conceived envisions a horizontal, peer-oriented
system of social control, in which each lawyer is responsible for his or
her own conduct and accountable solely to his or her peers within the
36. See Larson, supra note 15, at xvi, 7 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy 594 (1987) (noting two constructive
forces at work on social life, including restless experimentation with ideas and acceptance of one another).
38. See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 2, at 230, 230-31 (explaining
that professionalism consists of an institutional element of autonomy and a moral
element focusing on ethics).
39. See Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 835, 842-46
(1987).
40. Robert Gordon, Lawyers as the American Aristocracy 2-3 (1986) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
41. Id. at 9.
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profession as a whole.4 2 The recently marketed crisis in the profession
reveals that this idea of professional self-regulation, in which each
lawyer takes primary responsibility for policing his or her own conduct, is being challenged by the organization of the profession itself.
Today, many lawyers practice in large organizations-law firmswhich are arranged hierarchically and which expose lawyers to behavioral norms and pressures distinctive in large scale organizations.4 3 In
these organizations, demands for loyalty and responsiveness to the explicit directions or the implicit desires of superiors are real and pressing,'M and profitability is as much a watchword as professionalism.
The allegedly unifying ideal of lawyer professionalism is further
challenged by environmental forces pushing the "bottom line" as the
measure of professional performance. Professionalism may be enacted minimally at the level of conformity to the profession's rules,
but it may also, and as importantly, be enacted within the wide range
of discretion and judgment left open to professionals practicing within
the high pressure world of the large law firm."5 Conformity to the
profession's rules creates an abstract level of ethical propriety. Yet,
professionalism also is enacted daily in manners and styles of conduct
toward clients, other lawyers, and legal officials.
What follows are the accounts of various participants in a study of
professionalism in the context of litigation, of their explanations for
problems of incivility and hyper-adversarial behavior in that process,
and of their response to the "crisis" in ethics and civility. It is a description of talk, namely, the way judges and lawyers talk about their
work-in particular, their work as participants in, and managers of,
civil litigation, and about their own behavior and the behavior of
others. This talk is significant in its own right because it details the
way judges and lawyers see their worlds and the extent to which perceptions and beliefs are or are not shared. It assists in the mapping of
patterns of agreement and conflict in recognition of and in response to
problems, as well as the extent to which there is a common understanding of the crisis in big-firm litigation practice.
The research reported below is part of an effort to understand the
current "crisis" and to see how, if at all, it is reflected in the accounts
given by judges and lawyers of the way litigation is conducted. This
paper first attends to accounts of the nature of the adversary system
and its impact on litigation practices, then focuses on accounts of the
42. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L Rev. 799,
853-73 (1992).
43. See Robert L. Nelson, Partners With Power The Social Transformation of the
Large Law Firm 231-69 (1988); Marc Galanter, Mega-Lats' and Mega-Lawyvering in the

Contemporary United States, in The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors
and Others 152 (Robert Dinquall & Philip Lewis eds., 1982).

44. See Wilkins, supra note 13, at 80.
45. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L Rev.
1083, 1083-84 (1988).
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existence and importance of distinctive cultures in large law firms, and
finally moves on to a discussion of the dynamics of law practice and
the impact of those dynamics in leading otherwise responsible professionals into what some perceive to be professionally questionable or
undesirable conduct.
In evaluating those accounts, three factors should be considered.
The first is the elasticity of professionalism and the ways it is mobilized in struggles within the bar. This paper focuses on professionalism
as an ideology,46 or, more particularly, the way ideologies of work,
framed as accounts of conduct in litigation, are presented by judges
and lawyers. The second factor to consider is the great diversity and
segmentation of the bar and the fact that lawyers who practice in large
firms occupy distinctively different professional worlds and roles from
plaintiffs' lawyers and in-house counsel with whom they are in regular
contact. Here, professional values meet business values head-on; the
word "business" is taken to be as apt a description for the practice of
law as is the more venerable language of the learned professions. Finally, the third consideration is the fact that the ethical ideal of selfdiscipline and self-regulation runs up against the reality of practice in
large firms. It is in this context that one might examine Ethics: Beyond the Rules and the "crisis" to which this project is itself a
response.
I.

THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND THE "DEFAULT" NORMS
OF PROFESSIONALISM

Discussion among judges and lawyers about litigation and the
problems of ethics and civility was, perhaps not surprisingly, inextricably linked to discussions about the adversary system. As reflected in
comments by the lawyers and judges who participated in the discussions of Ethics: Beyond the Rules, the adversary system and the ideal

of zealous advocacy are both still alive and well. All of the participants-though to varying degrees-seem to subscribe to a version of
47
what David Luban calls the "dominant picture" of the lawyer's role.
In this conception,
The adversary system of justice ... lays the responsibility on each

party to advocate its own case and to assault the case of the other
party. Since this battle of arguments is conducted by lawyers, they
have a heightened duty of partisanship toward their own clients and
a diminished duty to respect the interests of their adversaries or of
third parties. The adversary system thus excuses lawyers from common moral obligations to nonclients.
The adversary system excuse carries as a corollary the standard
conception of the lawyer's role, consisting of (1) a role obligation
... that identifies professionalism with extreme partisan zeal on be46. See Nelson & Trubek, New Problems, supra note 25, at 15.
47. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study at xix (1988).
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half of the client and (2) the "principle of non-accountability,"
which insists that the lawyer bears no moral responsibility
for the
4
client's goals or the means used to attain them. T
This rhetorical commitment to adversarialism was manifest as largefirm lawyers discussed, among other things, counseling their clients
about disclosure obligations in discovery, their own obligations of candor, and preparing witnesses in depositions. In each of these situations, being "tough" and being ready to fight for the interests of their
client is, as Luban's argument suggests, the first prerequisite to being a
good lawyer.4 9 "Tough," as one judge observed about the behavior of
lawyers in litigation, "is the default position." Large-firm lawyers,
both partners and associates, plaintiffs' lawyers, and in-house counsel
all agreed, even as they deeply disagreed about many other things,
that their understandings of professionalism were structured by an adversary system which is "set up to be a fight" and in which the norm is,
"when in doubt-be tough."
This norm was played out, we were told, throughout the entire litigation process, including discovery. As one judge explained, "Gamesmanship is the norm in discovery. This is firm taught. Associates
often feel that what they do in discovery is make or break .... Young

lawyers are afraid; they fear releasing documents that may turn out to
be relevant." "Discovery," one plaintiffs' lawyer quipped, "is antics
with semantics." The structure of the adversary system itself, along
with the default norm of toughness, was seen by some lawyers and
judges to be in tension with the norms of disclosure which, at least in
theory, are supposed to govern discovery. These accounts suggest that
contentiousness and hyper-adversarialism in discovery arise, in part,
because lawyers are unable (or unwilling) to disconnect the adversarial norms that govern litigation from their behavior in the discovery
process. In some instances, as one judge put it, "The adversary system
seems to have become an end in itself. It is almost as if lawyers play
the game for its own sake."
What Luban calls the "dominant picture" of the lawyer's role was
reflected in the fact that several of the participants in Ethics: Beyond
the Rules confidently acknowledged the distinction between the rules
by which their conduct is governed and ordinary morality.50 In making this distinction, they provide an excuse for engaging in conduct
that "ordinary" people would neither understand nor condone. Such
participants argue that they are not "priests" whose responsibility it is
to engage in moral counseling wvith their clients, nor do they have a
duty to temper their representation in light of some set of moral criteria external to the legal system itself. As one lawyer put it, "I don't
48. Id. at xx.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 105-07.
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want to have a moral dialogue. The client didn't hire me to be a philosopher. If he wants that kind of advice he can go to a priest." Or, as
another said, "The fundamental problem of 'beyond ethics' is that the
justice system is not established for moral judgment.... The system is
not set up to answer moral questions."
Lawyers make judgments and enact professionalism already inscribed within a system that values aggressiveness more than sensitivity and defines success as winning within a set of rules whose basic
soundness most of the participants do not question. If there are
problems in litigation, this argument would suggest, the problems are
endemic to the adversary system.
Embrace of the adversary system as the default position also was in
the background of the explanations partners and associates provided
in response to questions having to do with "coaching" witnesses in
preparation for depositions. While several lawyers denied that they
"coach" witnesses ("educate" or "prepare" were the preferred terms),
all of them talked about the need to get witnesses ready by reminding
them to tell the truth and not to try to win the case during discovery.
But the injunction to tell the truth is based on a particular understanding of the truth, namely, to tell only that part of the truth which is
necessary to be responsive to the questions as they are asked. Such a
position is not considered either unethical or uncivil; it is part of an
adversary process in which each side carries the burden of making its
own case. Typically, witnesses are told to "give answers that will not
seem unresponsive, but that also won't open up areas of inquiry."
Some lawyers also report that they prepare witnesses by informing
them of what others have said on the subject and by reminding them
that it is "okay to say you don't remember." Each of these practices
reinforces the adversarial emphasis-the truth, but not the whole
truth until and unless asked. The lawyer's skill is knowing what has to
be said to be responsive, and, at the same time, to say that and nothing
more.
When asked to put this adversarial view of truth in the context of
complaints about unethical or uncivil behavior in litigation, most of
the large-firm partners with whom we spoke seem to have a wellhoned sense of tactics that are involved in simply being good, aggressive advocates, and the tactics that go beyond aggressiveness to incivility. While it is okay to make repeated objections as to form or to use
breaks to throw off questioners in depositions, or to take advantage of
a less experienced lawyer, it is not okay to threaten routinely to seek
sanctions or to call the opposing counsel or party names.
Yet, finding the line between aggressiveness and incivility may not
be so easy for lawyers in other positions in large firms. Associates are
told to be aggressive and are "chastised for not being aggressive
enough." As one said: "People are passed over for depositions when
they lack a reputation for aggressiveness." And another explained
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that "it is valuable to have a reputation as a hardball litigator." Moreover, partners believe that associates sometimes go too far in the direction of aggressiveness early in their careers; associates, some
partners suggest, tend to think of the other side as "the enemy." But,
as several partners note, with experience, good lawyers find ways to
be aggressive without being uncivil. In this climate, associates have to
figure out for themselves the limits of tolerable behavior vithin a
complex framework of rules and expectations.
Despite the effort to market a "crisis" concerning behavior in litigation, there was no consensus among those who participated in this
project, nor I suspect is there a consensus in the profession as a whole,
as to what constitutes aggressiveness without incivility. There was
agreement, however, among the judges and lawyers we studied that
what is clearly ethically problematic behavior rarely occurs in discovery. As one lawyer said: "Lawyers don't want to lose their licenses by
engaging in clear misconduct." The ethically problematic behavior
that would bring such a sanction is forbidden by applicable rules of
the legal system and the legal profession. Beyond that is the "adversary system excuse"'51 which treats behavior which would be unacceptable in other contexts as unproblematic-even if it is not desirableand which assigns ultimate responsibility for the moral content of a
client's position to the client himself.5 2 As one in-house lawyer said
about another lawyer's failure to clearly and correctly frame a discovery request, even if the other lawyer knew what was being asked for:
"The adversary system is not designed to encourage defense lawyers
to tell plaintiffs that they asked the wrong question."
Here, as elsewhere, when they talk about the standards that they set
for themselves, lawyers produce accounts which focus on the situation-specific character of their enactments of professionalism. How
they behave is, as one lawyer put it, a function of "the case, the client,
and the opposition." "Lawyers," as another explained, are "hired for
their judgment" and must be left to make judgments about the limits
of adversariness. Yet, the conditions for exercising (good) judgment
are often not present. One judge remembered that, as an associate in
a large firm, "I did document production myself. It was often at three
o'clock in the morning that I had to decide whether some document
was relevant. I received little mentoring, and I operated under great
pressure. Both make it difficult to exercise judgment."
As they accounted for the judgments that they did make, many of
the lawyers studied seemed somewhat inconsistent. They sometimes
said they strictly adhered to the "playing by the rules" conception of
their role; yet at other times, they spoke about the rules as providing
51. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Laqer. Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 83 (David Luban ed., 1983).

52. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Pro-

fessional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 30, 34-39.
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only the minimum content of professionalism or the floor above which
they have individual aspirations or standards. They claimed that those
aspirations or standards, as much as the rules themselves, help them
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate tactics and behavior. Thus, for most, it is okay to use tactics that lead opponents down
dead-ends, to delay in order to raise costs, and to use discovery to
"harass" opponents. But all of this must be done without name calling, without doing anything dishonest, and in the name of a "plausible" position or goal.
The widely-shared norm of discovery is, as previously suggested, to
"make the other side work." Under this norm, the obligation is on the
lawyer seeking information to know what he wants and to frame a
request which is both accurate and comprehensive. Even if one
knows what the other side is after, one should not produce it unless or
until one is specifically asked. So strong is this norm that when lawyers were presented with a rendition of a case (Fisons)5 3 in which defense lawyers initially responded to a discovery request in a narrow
and evasive fashion and in which eventually a highly relevant document was illegitimately withheld, they focused almost as much on
what they saw as the incompetence of the lawyer seeking that information, who did not adequately follow-up on the initially evasive response, as on the ethically problematic behavior of the respondent.
As one participant noted, "Refusal to answer (a discovery request) is
not an ethical problem because plaintiffs counsel can remedy it
(through motions to compel)." Or, as another said, "The limited response should have been a red-flag. The plaintiff's lawyer must have
been inexperienced. What we need to explain is what caused him to
stop asking."
Moreover, many of the participants in this project said that the kind
of behavior portrayed in Fisons-narrowing responses, delaying production, etc.-was typical. One of the judges talked about that case
and observed that: "There was nothing unusual about it. It happens
in every case." Another judge expressed a similar view: "Fisons isn't
unusual at all. The fact that documents are often hidden never comes
out. There is usually no consequence at all to an attorney for hiding
documents. What matters is keeping the client and winning the case."
And, as an in-house counsel said when asked to speculate about why
discovery problems like those in the Fisons case occur: "The norm is
that one generally responds as narrowly as possible. You keep stonewalling and reply as narrowly as possible. You don't volunteer anything in the hope they'll wear down."
Responses to the Fisons case were not, however, all so accepting.
Some participants insisted that instead of evading or consciously nar53. See Report, Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 691, app. at 885-87
(1998).
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rowing a response, defense lawyers have an obligation to state an objection and allow a judge to decide the question. Others suggest that
it is always better to deal with a bad document-either by making an
early and appropriate settlement offer, or by disclosing it in order to
avoid latter allegations of cover-up and misconduct.
Whatever their view of the propriety of the Fisons case, several
judges and in-house counsel accounted for the persistence of the "discovery game" exemplified in that case in terms of the economics of
the large law firm in which discovery disputes run up billable hours.
As one judge put it: "Discovery rules are supposed to facilitate truth
seeking, but in practice that is the last thing they are. They are a cashcow for lawyers for whom discovery is about hiding the pea."
This game is reflected in what is widely perceived to be a growth in
adversariness in discovery and in litigation. As one partner in a large
firm put it: "Today people believe that you succeed by always being
unreasonable and always bullying." Discovery and litigation, in this
view, are both less civil and fraught with what some lawyers saw as
unnecessary rancor and unpleasantness. This change, several argue, is
a result of growth in the bar; in a large bar, one is less likely to know,
and therefore trust, the lawyer on the other side. In addition, the
growing prominence of in-house counsel in managing litigation, some
partners alleged, has resulted in increased pressure for aggressiveness
from the consumers of litigation services.
Accounting for growing adversariness in discovery, some associates
note what they see as a generational difference within some of their
firms in the litigation styles of older and so-called "middle generation"
partners. The middle generation tends to be more aggressive, more
prone to "asshole" behavior. Associates speculate that this generational difference arises because the middle generation came of age
during the 1980s when there was a substantial growth in the economic
pressures on, as well as the economic opportunities for, large law
firms. Recognition of a generational shift is present, but less marked,
among the partners who participated in this project.
The generational shift explanation, of course, is at odds with the
adversary system, dominant conception explanation. But this tension
rarely was noted by our participants. In employing such an explanation, however, they fuel the rhetoric of decline which in turn plays an
important role in the explanations of those marketing a crisis in litigation. The generational shift explanation also opens up the question of
how, if at all, the large law firm functions to maintain and reproduce
high standards of conduct in litigation; whether there are distinctive
firm cultures; and whether those cultures matter in structuring lawyers' enactments of professionalism.
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THE CULTURE OF THE FIRM

What role does the so called "culture of the firm" play in the accounts provided by judges and lawyers of the conduct of litigation?
How effective are firms at socializing their members into the highest
standards of professionalism, at providing effective structures of social
control, and at responding to problems of incivility or to breaches of
ethics? Do firms have distinctive cultures that encourage ethical behavior and discourage abuses and uncivil behavior? The answers to
these questions seemed to vary by the position of lawyers within firms.
Thus, while they acknowledged that the present is unlike the past,
most partners nonetheless continue to believe that firms have distinctive cultures, and that those cultures function well in socializing their
members. As one said about her firm: "We do adhere to a culture.
We have learned in this culture."
Associates, however (even some in the same firms as partners who
expressed confidence in the existence and significance of firm culture), were less ready to concede that firm culture existed and expressed greater uncertainty about the socialization and social control
roles of the firms in which they worked. Furthermore, the assertion
that firm culture matters, combined with the considerable imprecision
as to its meaning and significance, were typical of the accounts provided by judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and in-house counsel. While some
spoke confidently of their ability to "identify a law firm by its style of
litigation," others were more uncertain, believing instead that litigation style varies more lawyer-by-lawyer rather than firm-by-firm.
Firm culture, if it exists, is said to be reproduced through what one
partner described as "conscious efforts to bring in 'people like us."'
Another suggested that "core values exist and are transmitted to our
associates.... 'Be honest with the court, your clients, and your opponents. You will follow the rules and more."' Still another contended:
"Firms matter in exercising control over deviants. We have a firm culture that encourages our lawyers to be honest and ethical. This is our
bread and butter." Throughout the study, if references were made to
firm culture, they were made in rather abstract terms; the content of
firm culture was equated with the least controversial content of professionalism. Questions of style, judgment, and the way professionalism is enacted in the daily conduct of litigation seem to exist below the
threshold at which firm culture asserts itself.
Moreover, even among partners, there was a recognition that firm
culture today may not be all that it is cracked up to be. Many acknowledged that in the current environment, there is less mentoring in
their firms than before. Rather than the informal learning by close
observation of an experienced lawyer that used to help socialize associates into the firm and its culture, there is now less time available for
such activities. Responsibility for the decline in such informal mentoring is assigned to corporate clients who are said to be no longer willing
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to absorb the costs of allowing associates to learn by observation.
"Clients used to invest in mentoring for young associates. Today, because they aren't committed to the firm, they don't want to invest in
that anymore."
In response, firms have instituted formal training programs for their
associates. What was once an easy, accepted part of big-firm practice
has taken on a more studied and formal character. Firms create Professional Responsibility Committees, institute lunches among partners
to discuss targeted questions about professional conduct, and/or designate ombudsmen to whom questions about ethics and professionalism
can be referred. Thus, if one just looked at the organization chart, one
would think that firms were deeply invested in their socialization and
social control functions.
Some partners, however, acknowledged that firm culture becomes
harder to maintain and identify as firms get larger and more specialized. As one partner said, "The notion of a firm culture becomes
more abstract and diffuse as the firm gets larger." Or, as another said,
"We have a strong firm culture about misconduct within the litigation
department, but the overall culture of the firm is weakening .... It is
fraying around the edges." The disaggregation of firm culture into the
cultures of its subdivisions may be especially consequential in litigation because it means that the aggressiveness which is the hallmark of
the litigator is not tempered by regular, informal interactions with
lawyers in other departments with different professional norms and
styles.
This disaggregation also means that there may be less control of,
and accountability for, individual enactments of professionalism than
might appear from the organization of committees, lunches, etc. As
one partner bluntly admitted, "One doesn't monitor one's partners."
Or, as another put it, "given the large size of firms you end up having
less confidence about the behavior of others." While several partners
conceded that there may be uncivil, hyper-aggressive litigators in their
firms, they suggested that there is little that could or should be done
about them. Controlling their behavior is impossible so long as it
stays within the range of the rules. Within that range everything is a
matter of personal style and judgment.
The alleged fraying of firm culture is not only a function of size and
specialization. It is, in addition, attributed to the increased recruitment of laterals, people socialized into the culture of one firm who are
brought into a different firm at a senior level and who are valued primarily for their skills at getting and keeping clients. "In the classic big
firm," Galanter and Palay wrote, "almost all hiring was at the entry
level. Partners were promoted from the ranks of associates. Those
who left went to corporations or smaller firms, not to similar large
firms .... But starting in the 1970s, lateral movement became more
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frequent."54 Many of the partners with whom we spoke noted the
significance of laterals in explaining changes in, and the weakening of,
the culture of the large law firm. "Having laterals," one said,
"changes the level of assurance that one can feel that there would be a
uniform response to any problematic situation in litigation." Or as
another noted in describing his firm: "It is now the internal culture
versus the outside invaders."
Laterals play an important symbolic role in signaling the transformation of the values of the firm and in providing an ideological lightning rod. They provide convenient, symbolic markers of the transition
from the hegemony of professional values, of collegiality and community within the firm, to the hegemony of business concerns, from professionalism to profit. Indeed, some partners contend that ethically
questionable conduct by partners who do a particularly good job in
bringing business to the firm is likely to be overlooked.
Finally, the presence of laterals marks a significant transformation
in the expectation of permanency and stability in firms. While lawyers
in the past spent their entire careers with the same firm, today there is
much greater mobility, as lawyers sell themselves and their client gathering skills to the highest bidder. There is, in addition, much greater
uncertainty among lawyers because they can no longer assume that
making partner means a lifetime of security. This uncertainty is, in
these explanations, related to the way big-firm lawyers behave in litigation. Indeed, one plaintiffs' lawyer quite emphatically insisted that
incivility and hyper-adversarialism, where it occurs among large-firm
lawyers, is simply an external manifestation of the internal life of the
firm. As he put it:
They live internally in a cannibalistic world. They have no regard
for each other .... They don't act differently toward their adversaries than they do toward each other. If you are a great lawyer, but
don't bring in fees, you are fired. The only common value among a
firm of 300 lawyers is money. There will be no other common
values.
Not surprisingly, the world of the firm seems quite different from
the perspective of associates than it does from the perspective of partners. As this Article has already suggested, firm culture played a
much less significant role in the accounts associates provided. As a
group, they were much less clear and certain about the existence of
the firm culture. One associate noted that "ethics is talked about the
first day and never talked about again. There may be a culture at the
top, but it doesn't filter down." Associates reported that they learned
most by observing senior associates as well as partners, and that the
firm most effectively transmitted its values not through formal mecha54. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Transformation of the Big Law Firm, in
Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 2, at 31, 50.
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nisms, but through the stories that were told about what happened in
a specific case. "The problem deposition," one associate explained,
"becomes part of the lore of the firm." Several associates argued that
large firms want and expect "quality work" even if the definition of
quality work is amorphous or idiosyncratic to particular partners.
Most of the associates seemed to share the view of one who said, "I
feel imprinted by the partners I work for-not by the firm."
When they were asked to discuss their own standards and aspirations as professionals and whether their standards were widely shared
in the firms where they worked, most associates were unable to identify with confidence the shared norms or aspirations of the firms. As
one said, "I have no idea how widely shared my standards of professional conduct are in our firm." Or, as another explained: "My firm is
very large.... You don't know what the standards are of most of the
lawyers in the firm. You only know from the lawyers with whom you
work directly."
Nonetheless, many associates believe that there are a large range of
things that their firms could or should do to encourage greater cohesion and promote high standards of professional conduct. These included: refraining from rewarding associates and partners who
engage in uncivil behavior; stopping catering to clients who want
hyper-aggressive lawyering; talking about and using ethical practices
as a criteria in evaluating associates; having associates evaluate partners' litigation behavior; and reducing reliance on billable hours
(which allegedly contributes to hyper-aggressiveness).
Associates also say that the partners within their firms are less sensitive than they should be to the climate concerning ethics and professionalism: "Partners think everything is fine." Another suggested
that partners "do not see that ethics is of inherent value. Ethics is
treated as a matter of sanctioning people for bad behavior rather than
rewarding good behavior." Associates reached no consensus, however, about the extent to which they were "on their own" in making
judgments and identifying norms of professionalism that their firm
would value. Some associates confidently asserted that "unethical behavior is an aberration" and that "there is a clear sense that the firm
matters in setting ethical expectations." Others reported considerable
"give and take among associates about how to handle cases." But several shared the sentiment of one who, like the judge quoted earlier,
said, "Most of the time you are working by yourself-collaboration is
absent. As a result, I have no clue what our firm culture is."
After listening to the accounts of partners and associates, one cannot have great confidence that firms today have distinctive cultures
into which their lawyers can predictably be socialized. Firms are too
large, segmented, and structured to maximize lawyer independence to
sponsor a single set of values except at the most general level. Even if
firm cultures do exist, they do not seem to be geared toward policing
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the everyday, often subtle, choices that lawyers make about their
practice styles. Socialization seems too incomplete and social control
in large firms seems too deferential, except when confronted with
gross violations of clear ethical norms, to ensure uniformly admirable
enactments of professionalism.
III. THE DYNAMICS OF LITIGATION:
THE "NOT IN My BACKYARD" SYNDROME
One might think that the willingness to concede that firm culture
does not play a consistently reliable role in controlling lawyer conduct
might be associated with a willingness on the part of those making
such a concession to accept personal responsibility for problems in
litigation. What is striking, however, as one listens to judges and lawyers talk about ethics and civility in litigation, is the extent to which
each group presents itself as a "victim" of forces over which it believes
it has little or no control. Furthermore, they blame others for "forcing" them to be more aggressive, and sometimes uncivil, than they
would be otherwise. Some of the forces onto which blame is shifted in
these accounts already have been named or alluded to-economic
pressures, increased competitiveness within the profession with a resulting emphasis on business and commercial values, the increased
number of laterals, etc. Notably absent, however, are recommendations concerning how best to respond to, or anticipate, changing environmental forces, and strategies for preserving or promoting
professional values.
In the accounts provided by partners in large firms, the chief source
of problems is the changing nature of their relationship with clients.
While, at one time, firms established long-term, continuing relations
with clients, today, as these accounts would have it, those relationships
are more difficult to find. One partner explained: "There is no longer
law firm-client loyalty. Clients are increasingly looking for and getting
an attack dog. People are very eager to satisfy the client who often is
sending a mixed message. They want someone who is tough, but they
don't want to pay the cost." One of the judges with whom we spoke
agreed, saying that "firms are not rewarded for being ethical." "Who
is the client looking for?" this judge asked rhetorically. "The client is
going to look for someone who will do almost anything to win their
case." Another judge suggested that "clients are worse than the lawyers they are hiring ....

Increasingly we are dealing with a business;

the obligations of a profession run in the opposite direction." Still
another noted that "defense lawyers are under a lot of pressure. Inhouse counsel is the master .... No one is looking for a reasonable
defense lawyer. The message sent is 'Take no prisoners.'
In this environment, the emphasis, in the accounts of partners in
large firms, is on pleasing the client rather than on developing a counseling relationship. Clients want to conduct their own document
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searches in response to discovery requests. In addition, there may be
great pressure from clients to limit discovery. "In-house counsel," one
lawyer told us, "generally want you to take a narrow interpretation of
a document request. When they take this position it makes it harder
to convince the business people to be reasonable." Big-firm lawyers
say that they are driven to heightened levels of aggressiveness to
please clients who can easily take their business elsewhere. "Today,"
one lawyer said, "you hear less talk about victories in court than about
victories in getting clients." This message is one which is transmitted
to associates, who seek to impress partners by showing their bravado
and toughness in discovery.
Large-firm lawyers note that business clients take the same bottomline attitude toward their legal work that they take toward everything
else and seem less interested in securing and supporting high levels of
professionalism. If there are problems in litigation, corporate clients
are responsible. Yet, perhaps not surprisingly, the accounts of inhouse lawyers have a very different flavor to them. Typical were the
comments of one in-house counsel who said:
I insist on a thorough cost-benefit analysis in every case. Outside
counsel don't do this .... The outside lawyer starts with a 'leave no
stone unturned' attitude. But every case does not require a Cadillac
defense. We insist that they ask whether the cost justifies the
benefit.
Partners respond by arguing that such cost-benefit thinking leads to
great cost-cutting pressures, to the point that they often feel that the
client is unwilling to pay for sufficient preparation. It may, in fact, be
that incivility is a substitute for being well-prepared. "It is no longer
sufficient to be good. You have to be the toughest or else your client
won't be satisfied."
Business clients have established their own well-staffed in-house
legal offices. As a result, today they are more sophisticated as consumers of legal services. They demand the highest quality service at
discount prices. But, in our conversations, they often seemed disdainful of, or hostile to, the large law firms wvith whom they deal. As one
said, "Why should I pay $500 per hour? There is a lot of high quality
lawyering around. I can get as good lawyering in Texas as I can in
New York." Or, as another inside lawyer explained, "outside firms
whine and want to maintain their high incomes. Large-firm lawyers
need to face facts. There are a large number of top-quality lawyers
around who will do it for less. 'We want to lower your annual
income."'
In-house counsel blame outside lawyers for hanging on to an outmoded ethos of professionalism instead of embracing a business ethos.
Here we see the limits of the Stanley Commission's model of professionalism as the governing ideology of the bar. "[Large law firms] are
behind on the learning curve," one in-house lawyer observed. "They
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look at bodies and billable hours to support partnership income."
Moreover, in this view, hyper-adversarialism and incivility occur because "outside counsel only care about proving that they are the best
lawyers in town. They end up creating more problems than they
solve." As one participant said: "Law firms use everything to make
things hard on the other side. They play on trivia, they play on
tactics."
Several in-house counsel noted what they saw as the economic interest of the hourly fee lawyer to "chum" cases and to use discovery
disputes to run up fees. Thus, in-house lawyers were deeply suspicious of large-firm litigators, who "are slow to respond to change. For
the large-firm lawyer the mere fact that we are asking them to do
things differently means that it is by definition not as good." "Consumers of legal services," one in-house counsel explained, "are forcing
change. For us efficiency is the key value." "Law firms," he said, "haven't yet caught up with the business environment." Or, as another
colorfully asserted, "It is like the family farm. Law firms will go the
way of the family farm." Still another said that the complaints that
one hears from large-firm lawyers are a function of the fact that "the
reigns on them are tighter. Many senior partners are disappointed
with diminishing access to senior executives .... It is a threat to their
ego to have to deal with the general counsel's office." From the point
of view of in-house counsel, there is indeed nothing special about legal
services; they can be purchased by a business like any other fee-forservice commodity, and they should be evaluated like any other supplier. Perhaps not surprisingly some plaintiffs' lawyers share this view.
For them lawyering is a form of commercial activity; it is, as one flatly
stated, "just a business."
In relations between big-firm lawyers and their corporate clients,
we see the clash of two different and deeply held views of what law
practice should be like-one of which emphasizes autonomy, the
other responsiveness, one which imagines itself as the carrier of the
practical wisdom of a learned profession, the other which seeks to
subject lawyers to business values. In the words of one in-house lawyer, "Professional ethics are the same as business ethics."
This difference of views cannot be overcome by the mere assertion
that law is a profession, no matter how often that assertion is repeated. Unless or until the bar deals explicitly with this difference in
perspective, mutual suspicion, if not outright hostility, between bigfirm litigators and litigation managers of large corporations will continue. However, the externalization of responsibility, the "not in my
backyard" accounting for problems in litigation, is, in the accounts of
in-house counsel, not limited to blaming big firms. In-house lawyers
also blame problems in litigation on plaintiffs' lawyers who, in their
view, bring frivolous cases, use the discovery process to try to figure
out whether they have a case, and seek to extort payments just for
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ceasing to be a nuisance. "I had the experience," one lawyer explained, "of saying to a plaintiff's lawyer that we had been mistakenly
named in a case. They said 'How much is it worth to you to let you off
the case?"' "We are abused," another contended, "by the extent of
discovery. Litigation is often just a fishing expedition." Or, as another put it, "We are on an unfair playing field."
Plaintiffs' lawyers likewise argue that the litigation playing field is
not even. They suggest, however, that the rules favor defendants who
are able to gain advantage just by "playing the game" in which "delay" is itself a kind of victory. They say that defendants, with or without the cooperation of their lawyers, routinely withhold relevant
information and seek to hide incriminating documents. "Defendants
know that they can come out on top by withholding." In their accounts, several plaintiffs' lawyers explained that outside lawyers typically adopt "a win-at-all-costs mentality in order to show how tough
they are," and that this attitude is essential to keep their corporate
clients. As one observed: "Defense lawyers cannot practice without
withholding stuff. Having a reputation for honesty and being forthright means losing clients ....The result is that no one produces what
they are supposed to produce." Moreover, several plaintiffs' lawyers
suggested, echoing the views of some of the in-house counsel, that
there is a kind of mutuality of interest between themselves and
outside counsel. "Defense lawyers love us. When I get in a case, it
means that their fees will be run up." In this view, plaintiffs' lawyers
and their big firm counterparts understand the nature of the "game";
in-house counsel typically do not. Thus, when the latter get involved,
"they really screw up the works. They are the client, and they personalize the litigation ....They make it harder to do business." Indeed,
from our conversations with different groups of lawyers, this observation seemed true. In-house counsel display a deep sense of grievance
about the behavior of plaintiffs' lawyers and the conduct of litigation.
To the extent that plaintiffs' lawyers push the limits of civility or
adopt a hyper-adversarial posture, they, like other lawyers with whom
we spoke, argue that they are "forced" to do so in order to establish
credibility with corporate defendants and their lawyers. "You have to
get to the point where the defendant's lawyers respect you. To get to
that point you have to keep on attacking. You have to make them
fear you." Aggressiveness is presented then as a defensive and strategic response to a posture of non-disclosure and cover-up that plaintiffs' lawyers say is a routine response to their legitimate requests for
information. "You have to beat up the defendant," one lawyer explained, "until they give up."
Given this climate, in-house counsel, while conceding that everything depends on the case and the stakes, were divided about how
tough and aggressive they want their outside lawyers to be in response. While one observed that, "The lawyer who isn't aggressive
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enough doesn't get another case," another said that "the general rule
is that we do not want to be easy in depositions ....The tone set is to
be aggressive within the rules, to zealously defend the company ...
This often means reveal as little as possible as late as possible."
Others noted, however, that, "outside counsel often go beyond where
I think they should. They try to show how good they are by being
tough." Another lawyer suggested that the "pitbull" loses credibility.
A third described what he called "the life-cycle of litigation in large
firms" which involves "overenthusiasm, followed by boredom, followed by cold feet." Outside lawyers were said to "be afraid to lose a
case. They try to avoid any risky strategies. They fear they will fall
into disfavor." The response of in-house lawyers is to insist on close
communication and "partnering." Large-firm lawyers, in turn, tend to
see these actions as limiting their professional autonomy and turning
them from lawyers into technicians.
If there is one source of responsibility commonly identified in the
accounts of all types of lawyers, it is the judiciary. If there is one thing
that lawyers, whatever their type of practice and practice setting, seem
to agree upon it is that judges hate to get involved in discovery disputes; most judges find managing discovery to be uninteresting, and as
a result, many take a hands-off approach, leaving it to the lawyers to
play the discovery game with relatively little supervision. One lawyer
suggested that "discovery issues pose hard questions. Judges have to
get into the nitty-gritty. It is a pain in the neck for judges."
Some of the judges we talked to agreed that they have great power
to control behavior in litigation, which many conceded they do not
use. As one said, "What the judge will tolerate sets the standard."
Another commented: "Discovery abuses can be stopped by a judge.
A lot of efforts to bend the rules come from a feeling of security that a
judge will never look and see what they have done." Still a third
noted that "discovery disputes are a nuisance .... If we get into the
question of sanctions we have litigation within litigation .... Putting
time into sanctions does not move the case toward resolution."
Yet judges, like the others with whom we spoke, do not typically
accept responsibility. They, too, present themselves as "victims" and
point to caseload pressures and/or their view that judges should not
get into the business of "doing the lawyer's job for them" to explain
why many do not get involved in managing discovery. "To find sanctionable conduct takes a lot of time," one judge explained, "so judges
tend not to find such conduct." And as another judge said, "If we do
impose sanctions for discovery abuse, we almost always get reversed
on appeal. The result is that lawyers know that there are no teeth in
the authority of the court." The "don't blame us" attitude toward litigation problems found in each group of lawyers with whom we spoke
is alive in the judiciary as well.
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CONCLUSION:

A

PROFESSION IN DENIAL? OR, "WHAT CRISIS?"

In the accounts of most of the lawyers and judges with whom we
spoke two things stand out: first, ethical problems are not high on

their list of concerns; second, when breaches occur, responsibility for
incivility and for professional deviance is placed elsewhere-by largefirm lawyers on plaintiffs' lawyers, in-house counsel, and judges; by
plaintiffs' lawyers on defendants and their lawyers who allegedly routinely hide documents and abuse discovery and on a "defense oriented" judiciary; by in-house counsel on plaintiffs' lawyers who file
frivolous cases and use discovery as fishing expeditions, on large firms
that are reluctant to take risks and that are too interested in protecting their own privileges; and by judges on lawyers who do not take
their professional obligations seriously enough and on appellate
courts that routinely undo whatever trial judges try to do to manage
the discovery process. Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman call this
style of account "scapegoating."' ' 5 "Using this form," Scott and
Lyman stated, "a person will allege that his questioned behavior is a
response to the behavior or attitudes of another." 56
Although the lawyers and judges with whom we spoke acknowledged that there are problems in civil litigation and in discovery, they
believe that those problems are either inextricably bound up with the
practices of the adversary system itself or the products of a few bad
apples or "assholes." As to the latter, there is no possible response.
As to the former, those we interviewed believe deeply in the adversary system. In their view, it works; it serves our society well, even in
the face of its excesses. Incivility and the occasional ethical lapse
merely are part of the "price of doing business" in such a system.
While many of the lawyers and judges recognized the pervasiveness
of hyper-adversariness in litigation and acknowledged that hiding documents was a daily occurrence, this perception existed side-by-side
with the view that there is no "crisis" in the litigation system. "There
is just a more thorough examination of big-firm practices," one judge
noted, "rather than a change of conduct." From these responses, it
seems that the effort to market a perception of crisis in litigation has
not succeeded, at least not at the level of persuading lawyers and
judges that there are deep systemic problems requiring systemic
solutions.
Yet, the combination of factors that lawyers and judges describehyper-adversarial orientations combined with a weakened, or fraying,
and segmented firm culture; pressures from clients animated by bottom-line, cost-benefit orientations; competitiveness driving lawyers to
be tough as a way of pleasing clients: and the absence of reliable and
consistent judicial supervision-all seem to encourage lawyers to get
55. Scott & Lyman, supra note 30, at 50.
56. 1&
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close to the line at which aggression turns into incivility, and adversariness into breaches of ethics, rather than to stay far away from it.
Thus, it should not be surprising that lawyers sometimes miss the
mark. As Diane Vaughan explains in her recent book, The Challenger
Launch Decision:
Two observations are generally held to be true. First, in industries
and organizations where misconduct occurs, normative environments exist that conflict with those of the outside world: what society defines as illegal, deviant, or unethical comes to be defined in
the industry and organization as normative. Second, these normative environments have a unidimensional character. Reflecting
competitive pressures from the environment, organizational culture
emphasizes production goals, which are presumed to be the driving
force behind
57 calculated decision making that culminates in volatile
behavior.

What Vaughan says about organizations in general seems particularly appropriate to the world of litigation in large law firms in which
lawyers' ethics, with their studied departures from ordinary morality,
define the normative environment and in which production goals are
increasingly emphasized. In such an environment, as Vaughan suggests, the tasks of socialization to appropriate conduct and social control of deviance are unusually difficult:
[R]ather than contemplating or devising a 'deviant' strategy for
achieving the organization's goals and then invoking techniques of
neutralization in order to proceed with it or rationalize it afterward,
they may never see it as deviant in the first place. How influential
can the deterrent effects of punishment and costs be when environmental contingencies, cultural beliefs, and organizational structures
and processes shape understandings so that actors do not view their
behavior as unethical, deviant, or having a harmful outcome?5 8
If we take seriously the need to respond to problems of ethics and
civility in litigation and the rhetoric of crisis marketed by groups like
the Stanley Commission, then we should learn several things from the
accounts provided by judges and lawyers in Ethics: Beyond the Rules.
First, some of those problems are indeed endemic to the adversary
system itself. They cannot, and will not, be rooted out by any incremental reforms. Getting serious about those problems will require a
serious re-examination of the so-called "adversary system excuse" and
the "dominant conception" of lawyering which it encourages. To the
extent that adversarial norms are embraced and put side-by-side with
a discovery system that is governed by norms requiring disclosure, we
should expect problems to occur. Perhaps the way to promote a more
57. Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture,
and Deviance at NASA 406 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
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civil climate in litigation and to avoid the most egregious ethical violations involves changing the structure of the adversary system itself.
Second, firms have a large role to play in monitoring and regulating
the conduct of their lawyers, whether partners or associates. Surely a
changed legal environment has placed great strains on the capacity of
firms to play such a role. But unless and until firms muster the will to
adapt to this changed environment in ways that are supportive of socalled professional values, little progress can be made.
Third, the culture of denial and the externalization of responsibility
that accompanies it is itself a problem. Each segment of the bench
and bar has earned its share of the blame for a litigation process that
almost everyone concedes constantly grows less and less civil and
more and more unmanageable. Until that blame is acknowledged, the
attitude of "It's the other fella's fault" will continue to be matched
with an attitude of "Let others clean up their act." Both attitudes
ensure that little impetus for significant change is likely to come from
within the profession itself.
Finally, it may be that different, or more refined, answers would
emerge if we studied behavior, not talk, and if we were able to test
hypotheses about the conditions and contingencies that shape behavior in litigation. Yet, from the perspective of an interest in the ideological contests surrounding ideas of professionalism, and the accounts
to which those contests give rise, it may be that the most important
product of our work is a greater awareness of the real diversity in the
profession-a diversity born not just of the different social backgrounds from which lawyers come, but also of the distinctive perspectives which are cultivated by those in different kinds of practices. In
the face of this diversity, we might ask: "For whom do problems of
hyper-adversariness and incivility, and the occasional, though highly
publicized, breach of ethics constitute a crisis, and what power or influence can they mobilize to persuade others to change?" In answering that question, we may get one angle from which to understand
where energy for reform is likely to emerge and what its likelihood of
success might be.

Notes & Observations

